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'The money process still required a deep, unacknowledged act of faith, so 
mysterious that it could easily be confused with divine powers'1 
 
Central banks are not traditionally thought of as being socially accountable. In fact, 
the main innovation of central banks in the 20th century was to make them largely 
independent from political influence. Thus, the prevailing (economic) analyses of 
central bank accountability have examined the formal relationships of 
accountability to political bodies such as the legislature and the executive. However, 
this article argues that trends in monetary policy-making beginning in the 1990s 
inadvertently led to the potential for greater social accountability of central banks. 
Driven by a shifting economic consensus, central banks moved from an approach of 
secretive currency management to transparent communication with the market. This 
transformation was prompted by new beliefs about the efficiency of monetary policy. 
This article argues that the current 'hard law' framework for central bank 
accountability does not reveal all of the social mechanisms in place. In fact, 'soft law' 
instruments are causing more and faster institutional changes in the legal framework 
for the central bank accountability. The role of law is changing accordingly: central 
banks have their actions controlled in an ex post model of supervision rather than 
an ex ante form. This study explores the institutional development of accountability 
mechanisms in two central banks in advanced economies (the US Federal Reserve 
and the European Central Bank) and in a monetary authority in an emerging 
economic power (the Brazilian Central Bank). All the three central banks had the 
same institutional development, despite the significant differences in terms of 
political, social and economic contexts in which they operate. 
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1 William Greider, Secrets of the Temple: How the Federal Reserve Runs the Country 
(Touchstone Book 1987). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Amongst the attributes of sovereignty, central banks (CBs) are as 
important as symbols, as flags and national anthems. CBs are important 
institutions in domestic politics and their actions have a direct impact on 
households and firms. Those CBs that manage currencies accepted as 
international means of payment and investment vehicles can also shape 
financial politics worldwide. In the management of the 2008 crisis, CBs 
gained even greater powers to act in financial markets in order to stabilize 
credit and money markets. The impact of their actions could be felt on a 
global scale. With these growing powers, it is doubly important that the 
appropriate accountability mechanisms are in place. 
 
The central goal of this paper is a comparative analysis of three central 
banks and their institutional design for the exercise of monetary power. 
This study analyses 'hard law' mechanisms (established by treaties, 
constitutions or statutes) for social accountability in three CBs: the 
European Central Bank (ECB), the United States (US) Federal Reserve 
(Fed) and the Brazilian Central Bank (BCB). It then examines 'soft law' 
mechanisms, usually created by CBs themselves, since in some institutions 
these instruments can play an important role for legitimacy and 
accountability. 
 
This paper takes a specific legal approach. It conceives of law as a 
framework to hold CBs accountable. Accountability can be defined as a 
social relationship between an actor and a forum in which the actor is 
obliged to explain and justify his conduct; the forum can pose questions, 
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pass judgment and the actor may face consequences for his actions.2 For 
the purpose of this study, monetary accountability is scrutiny of the 
monetary policy implemented by CBs and the potential imposition of 
sanctions should policy be deemed inappropriate. 
 
The Fed (established in the 1910s) and the ECB (established in the 1990s) 
are the most important CBs in the world. They issue the two leading 
currencies, with the US dollar and the Euro being most frequently used 
internationally as means of payment, reserves and investment vehicles for 
both states and private actors.3 Their actions, therefore, have more 
stakeholders than other CBs: since their currencies are de facto used at the 
level of the international monetary system, these two CBs carry out global 
financial missions even without specific legal mandates covering their 
global actions. For these banks, therefore, accountability and transparency 
mechanisms are especially relevant. The BCB, a monetary authority in a 
rising economic power, established in the 1960s, is an example of an 
institution that has its policies highly influenced by foreign markets in US 
dollars and the Fed's policies. 
 
These three CBs were established in very different historical moments and 
political contexts. Yet, interestingly, they have developed the same legal 
framework for accountability and transparency – i.e. based on instruments 
of soft law – and are held accountable not to political agents, but mainly to 
national and international economic actors. This can be explained with 
reference to the economic consensus on monetary policy implementation 
that has been pervasive since the 1990s: price stability as the main 
monetary goal and market communication as an instrument to manage 
inflation expectations.4 The earlier mystery and the secrecy of the currency 
management have been replaced by the disclosure of methods and goals for 
the CBs' decision-making process. This framework of transparency was 
designed with an underlying economic purpose, i.e. to provide information 
to markets; however, it established new instruments that potentially can 
improve CBs' accountability towards political and social actors, both at the 
domestic and global level. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Mark Bovens, 'Analysing and Assessing Accountability: a Conceptual Framework' 
[2007] 13 ELJ 447; Mark Bovens, 'Two Concepts of Accountability: Accountability as 
a Virtue and as a Mechanism' [2010] 33 WEP 946. 
3 Benjamin Cohen and Tabitha M Benney, 'What does the international currency 
system really look like' (2014) 21(5) RIPE 
 http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rrip20/21/5#.VRgsa_nF9cg (accessed 12 January 
2015). 
4 Alan Blinder, The Quiet Revolution: Central Banking goes Modern (Yale University 
Press 2004); Charles Goodhart, 'The Changing Role of Central Banks' (2010) 1(1) BIS 
http://www.bis.org/publ/work326.pdf (accessed 15 July 2012); Marvin Goodfriend, 
'How the World Achieved Consensus on Monetary Policy' [2007] 21 JEP 47; Rosa 
Lastra, 'The role of central banks in monetary affairs: a comparative perspective' and 
Christine Kaufmann and Rolf H Weber 'Transparency and monetary affairs' in 
Thomas Cottier et al (orgs), The Rule of Law in Monetary Affairs (CUP 2014). 
2015]         Social Accountablity of Central Banks      100 
 
	   	  
The main arguments of this paper are as follows: (i) the current 'hard law' 
framework does not reveal all of the social accountability mechanisms in 
place in the CBs under study; (ii) while 'hard law' mechanisms still 
represent an important component of the legal framework designed for 
social accountability, 'soft law' mechanisms are causing more and faster 
institutional changes in the accountability and, consequently, the 
legitimacy of CBs; and (iii) based on findings (i) and (ii), the role of law in 
this domain has changed: CBs have their actions controlled in ex post form 
(political powers and social actors evaluate if the CB attained its goals) 
rather than an ex ante model (by a prior definition of policy limits, e.g. a 
ceiling for reserve requirements or a limit for the issuance of paper 
money). 
 
This article is divided into six sections. Following this introduction, I 
present an overview of the economic literature on accountability in CBs. I 
then identify the main gap in this literature and highlight what a legal 
perspective can add to the study of this subject. The third section 
proposes a legal concept for accountability and discusses how it can be 
applied to the study of CBs. The fourth section presents the case studies, 
analysing the social accountability mechanisms in the ECB, the Fed and 
the BCB that have a 'soft law' nature. This research focuses on the analysis 
of accountability instruments geared towards the general public and 
political powers (what is usually referred to in the economic literature as 
'operational transparency').5 The fifth section presents the main 
conclusions related to the case studies and highlights directions for future 
work. The final section concludes. 
 
II. A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH ON CENTRAL 
BANK ACCOUNTABILITY: SOFT LAW NEGLECTED 
 
In the economic literature, there is no broad agreement on the exact 
relationship between the concepts of accountability and transparency. 
Empirical economic research on central banks is usually based on rankings 
of these banks on the basis of their accountability and transparency. 
However, there is often confusion between authors' description of ex ante 
or ex post accountability, as well as de facto or de jure transparency in the 
form of disclosure of monetary targets, procedures and information.6 By 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 For detailed studies of political accountability mechanisms, see the well-known 
research of Fabian Amtenbrink, The Democratic Accountability of Central Banks: A 
Comparative Study of the European Central Bank (Oxford and Portland 1999); Bernard J 
Laurens; Marco Arnone and Jean-François Segalotto, Central Bank Independence, 
Accountability and Transparency: a Global Perspective (Palgrave Macmillan 2009); Camila 
Duran, L'encadrement Juridique de l'Accountability de la Politique Monétaire : une étude de 
la Banque Centrale Brésilienne (BCB), de la Banque Centrale Européenne (BCE) et de la 
Réserve Fédérale des États-Unis (Fed) (Atelier National de Reproduction des Thèses 
Lille 2012). 
6 Jakob De Haan, Fabian Amtenbrink and Sylvester C W Eijffinger, 'Accountability 
of central banks: aspects and quantification' (1998) Working paper avaiable at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1307581 (accessed 5 May 2011); Amtenbrink (n 5); Lorenzo 
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contrast, this paper clearly argues that accountability is essentially an ex 
post mechanism, yet ex ante targets are needed for ex post evaluation of the 
CB's actions. 
 
Laurens et al.,7 for example, evaluate an extensive sample of 98 monetary 
authorities. The authors examine accountability mechanisms such as the 
legal definition of monetary targets (including their prioritization and 
quantification), the legal obligation to explain and justify actions taken  
(i.e. the publication of reports addressed to political authorities and to the 
public in general) and the existence of a decision-making process that 
provides detailed explanation of reasons underpinning collective 
deliberations. Transparency was defined as operational (disclosure of 
targets), economic (disclosure of monetary strategies and analysis) and in 
relation to procedures (publication of minutes or voting records).  
 
They argue that there is a positive and significant correlation between 
accountability and transparency, i.e. accountable CBs tend also to achieve 
a high degree of transparency.8 Nonetheless, this correlation could also 
imply that they are measuring the same phenomenon. Transparency 
facilitates and integrates the political process of accountability. Scrutiny of 
CBs' actions is based on disclosure. Moreover, transparency could be 
conceived as a form of social accountability, which allows other 
stakeholders – not only national political powers – to evaluate CBs' 
decisions and make judgments. 
 
This flaw, of seeing transparency as distinct from accountability when in 
fact the two are mutually reinforcing and, at root, the same phenomenon, 
becomes evident when considering a subset of the monetary authorities 
studied by Laurens et al: those in advanced economies (25 Central Banks). 
The authors find that in these institutions a high degree of transparency 
was not followed by a proportional growth in 'accountability' mechanisms. 
This variation can be explained, according to the authors, by the legislative 
process for establishing the instruments to hold CBs accountable. Since 
creating accountability mechanisms requires a change in legislation, it is 
dependent on political will and, thus, demands a higher political consensus. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Bini-Smaghi and Daniel Gros, 'Is the ECB accountable and transparent?' (2001) 
European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA), Maastricht ; N Nergiz Dincer 
and Barry Eichengreen, 'Central bank transparency: where, why, and with what 
effects?' (2007) NBER Working Paper Series 13003/2007; Carin van der Cruijsen, 
David-Jan Jansen and Jakob de Haan, 'How much does the Public Know About the 
ECB's Monetary Policy? Evidence from a Survey of Dutch Households' (2010) ECB 
Working Paper Series 1265 1/2011 
 http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1265.pdf (accessed 18 November 
2012); Laurens et al (n 5). This argument also applies to official documents, see 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 'Code of good practices on transparency in 
monetary and financial policies: declaration of principles' (1999) IMF, Washington 
DC. 
7 Laurens et al (n 5). 
8 ibid, 137-163. 
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The barrier to establishing 'formal' accountability rules is, thus, deemed 
higher than for transparency mechanisms. Laurens et al also argue that 
CBs in advanced economies were able to use new technological tools to 
improve transparency, but they have not invested the same amount of 
efforts in their 'accountability frameworks'.9 
 
I argue that this economic perspective on CB accountability is premised 
on two inaccurate assumptions: (i) the tools of transparency are necessarily 
'informal' (de facto) and (ii) the accountability mechanisms have primarily a 
political nature and are always 'formal' (de jure), i.e. they are established by 
hard law and aimed at accountability to political powers. 
 
The economic perspective tends to reduce the social relations of 
accountability only to reports required by hard law. It ignores instruments 
with a low degree of normativity or 'legalness' (such as regulations and CBs' 
regulatory decisions), which also create relationships of accountability. The 
economic perspective fails to capture the complexity of these social 
mechanisms, since they can be established through soft law, i.e. by political 
decisions with a lower degree of formality. 
 
In fact, at the same time as developed countries' CBs have innovated on 
instruments to achieve better communication with markets, they have 
established greater accountability instruments. However, these 
accountability mechanisms have emerged as soft law, outside of the battles 
in the political arena, and have, therefore, gone unnoticed in the economic 
literature, which refers to them only as 'mechanisms of operational 
transparency'. 
 
However, it is important to mention that the mere existence of soft law 
accountability mechanisms does not necessarily mean CBs will be 
accountable. Soft law can encourage innovation and experimentation, but 
there is a risk: it can also be a way to avoid definite, binding commitments, 
allowing CBs to easily change the mechanisms in moments of pressure.10 
Further, the growing complexity of monetary policy, especially during 
times of crisis, could undermine the effectiveness of accountability 
mechanisms, especially for a broad public audience that, unlike market 
participants, may struggle to understand the implications of complex 
monetary policy decisions. 
 
Nonetheless, law (even, soft law) is not neutral or external to the political 
process of CB accountability. Law is a technical and symbolic discourse 
that can both aid monetary policy implementation and at the same time 
promote accountability. Once legal mechanisms to hold CBs accountable 
are established and an institutional space for dialogue (between social 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 ibid, 172. 
10 Nicholas Bayne, 'Hard and Soft Law in International Institutions: Complements, 
not Alternatives' in John Kirton and Michael Trebilcock, Hard Choices, Soft Law 
(University of Toronto 2007). 
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actors, political powers and the CB's managers) is created, there is already 
an effect on the operations of the CB. This structure is an institutional 
reality and may allow social actors to contest the political choices 
underlying monetary policy implementation and its distributional effects. 
 
After an important historical period of innovations in monetary actions, 
e.g. balance-sheet policies and quantitative easing (QE),11 the period after 
the 2008 crisis has re-focused on the question of accountability. As 
demonstrated in Section 4, all three CBs appear to have the legal 
instruments that would allow for ex post evaluation, yet until now only the 
Fed has been seriously called to account for its decisions.12 
 
Given this argument for the importance of soft law accountability 
mechanisms, several steps are necessary to ascertain their true impact on 
CBs' accountability legal framework. First of all, it is necessary to identify 
whether an accountability instrument is in fact a legal rule. Once created, 
the legal rule generates a social expectation for the maintenance of the 
mechanism. In time, this rule can then create a forum to question and 
make judgements about monetary options. That seems to have happened 
with the Fed's actions in the aftermath of 2008 crisis: political and social 
judgements on the efficiency and fairness of these actions were feasible.13 
Secondly, monetary policy is a complex and arguably scientific issue (at 
least, this is how the discourse around monetary policy describes it), but it 
has clear wealth distributional effects between classes (and even nations), 
i.e. it has a political nature. Therefore, the potential public impact of an 
accountability rule is significant. It permits the assessment of political 
choices that have social effects. It compels public authorities to explain 
their rationale. As long as more instruments of transparency are 
established by rules, it will be more difficult to remove them. I argue below 
that CB regulations and decisions do in fact have a legal nature and that 
CBs have established accountability mechanisms since the 1990s. These 
instruments can potentially reinforce the accountability of CBs over time. 
After a period of crisis, CBs' decisions are today again being questioned 
and these instruments are, therefore, even more important. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Hervé Hannoun, 'The Expanding Role of Central Banks since Crisis: What are the 
Limits' (2011) 150th Anniversary of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation BIS 
1/2011 http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100622.pdf (accessed 10 April 2012); Philipp 
Bagus and David Howden, 'Qualitative Easing in Support of a Trumbling Financial 
System: a look at the Eurosystem's Recent Balance Sheet Policies' (2009) 29(3) IEA 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0270.2009.01948.x/abstract (accessed 
22 March 2012); Bagus and Markus H Schiml, 'New Modes of Monetary Policy: 
Qualitative Easing by the Fed' (2009) 29(2) IEA 
 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0270.2009.01893.x/abstract 
(accessed 23 March 2012). 
12 See 'US Federal Reserve faces heightened scrutiny from Congress' (12 May 2015) 
Financial Times. 
13 ibid. 
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The three CBs chosen for this case study were established in different 
historical periods: the 1910s (the Fed), the 1990s (the ECB), and the 1960s 
(the BCB). They operate in very different political and economic contexts. 
Also, there is a huge variation between their institutional set-up: one CB is 
a supranational institution with monetary powers and limited financial 
regulation authority (the ECB); the other is a federal agency that works 
alongside with regional private banks (the Fed); and the third one is a 
national and centralized CB, not de jure independent from political powers 
in contrast with the other two (the BCB). 
 
However, they were chosen because the two advanced economies' CBs and 
the emergent BCB have developed the same institutional pattern during 
the last decade: they have innovated their accountability framework 
through soft law instruments. As said above, this specific form of 
institutional innovation can be attributed to an economic consensus on the 
nature of monetary policy implementation. These CBs have specific 
concerns in relation to operational transparency. Both ECB and Fed 
manage international currencies. The BCB, in turn, is concerned with 
foreign investments in the Brazilian financial market and capital flows. 
 
III. THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF CENTRAL BANK 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
The aim of this section is to identify the legal structure of mechanisms 
dedicated to the CB accountability. For this purpose, it is pertinent to 
develop a theoretical framework for the recognition of an accountability 
rule: How do we know an accountability rule when we see one? 
 
As outlined in the introduction above, accountability is an established 
social relationship between an actor and a forum in which the actor is 
obliged to explain and justify its conduct; the forum can pose questions, 
pass judgments and the actor may face consequences.14 Monetary 
accountability is a form of scrutiny and implies the potential use of 
sanctions over the currency management implemented by the CBs. 
Monetary accountability is a social relationship institutionalized by law. 
The legal framework for monetary accountability implies rules with 
different degrees of 'legalness'15 – i.e. soft or hard in a continuum. I conceive 
normativity or 'legalness' as a matter of graduation.16 Legalness is the 
quality of a legal standard that creates an accountability mechanism.17 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Bovens (n 2). 
15 This study employs the concept of 'legalness' as 'juridicité' as developed by Gérard 
Timsit, Archipel de la Norme (PUF 1997). 
16 Alain Pellet, 'The normative dilemma: will and consent in international law-
making. Rapport au colloque de Canberra 1990' (1992) Australian Ybk of Intl L; 
Kenneth W Abbott and Duncan Snidal, 'Hard and Soft Law in International 
Governance' [2009] 54(3) IO 421; Catherine Thibierge, 'Rapport de Synthèse: le 
Droit Souple' in Catherine Thibierge, Le Droit Souple: Journées Nationales - Tome XIII 
Boulogne-sur-mer (Dalloz 2009). 
17 Timsit (n 15). 
105                                      European Journal of Legal Studies  [Vol.8 No.2 
 
	  
 
Accountability rules involve legal procedures and parameters for monetary 
actions. This legal relationship encompasses interaction between different 
agents – CBs and the forums in which they can be scrutinized. The forums 
have the legal power to assess, judge and potentially impose sanctions on 
the CBs (table 1). 
 
Table 1. Monetary accountability as a social relationship and as a 
legal framework 
 
In addition, one must distinguish two different perspectives for the 
analysis of accountability relationships. Accountability may be conceived 
as a virtue or as a mechanism.18 As a normative concept (accountability as a 
virtue), it is a set of standards for the evaluation of public agents' 
behaviour, i.e. did CBs behave in a manner that was accountable to its 
stakeholders? In a narrower and descriptive sense, accountability is an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 ibid. 
The social relationship 
of accountability is: 
Rules intended to improve the social 
accountability of a monetary authority 
are: 
 
1.  A relationship 
between an actor and a 
forum, … 
 
 
Relational rules – between a CB and social 
forums – … 
2. …in which the actor 
is obliged… 
 
…institutionalized by law … 
3. …to explain and 
justify… 
 
…which define a legal form of scrutiny … 
4. …his conduct. 
 
 
…of an action or an omission (the object of 
accountability process). 
5. The forum can pose 
questions, … 
 
The forum has the legal power to scrutinize 
the CB. There are procedures and 
parameters for monetary actions established 
by legal instruments (soft or hard law). 
 
6. …pass judgments … 
 
7. …and the actor may 
face consequences. 
The forum can impose sanctions: legal, 
economic, reputational or social repressive 
measures. 
 
The legal nature of an accountability rule 
does not depend on the legal nature of its 
sanction. 
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institutional relationship or an arrangement in which an actor can be held 
to account by a forum, i.e. can the CB be held responsible for its actions by 
its stakeholders? This study conceives the monetary accountability 
relationship in the latter, descriptive sense and my legal approach sees law 
as an instrument for institutional design. 
 
Social accountability involves the scrutinization of CBs by social forums. 
The social forums may comprise citizens, communities, independent 
media and interest groups, including academics, professional peers, market 
and civil committees. They are the 'CB watchers'. 
 
This paper conceives of social accountability in terms of what Grant and 
Keohane19 classify as market and peer accountability relationships. Market 
accountability is a relationship whose forum comprises consumers and 
investors (equity- and bond-holders). It is characterized by their influence, 
which is exercised in whole or in part through market mechanisms. In 
monetary accountability, the market relationships include international or 
national investors who act directly on the real economy or through 
financial markets. These actors have their financial decisions influenced by 
monetary policy. In turn, consumers 'hold' fiat money (managed by a CB). 
Sanctions from these market actors may manifest as restrictions on access 
to capital, demands of higher interest rates or even refusal to accept fiat 
money. 
 
Peer accountability arises as the result of scrutiny by professional 
institutions or organizations characterized by the same scientific values 
and ideas. Sanctions issued by this type of social forum are related to 
effects on network ties, scientific support, reputation and prestige. Grant 
and Keohane20 identify 'public reputation' as a type of accountability 
mechanism. Nevertheless, 'public reputation' can be affected by several 
different social forums (whether professional, related to market, etc), or 
even by political forums. In addition, reputational sanctions very often 
have the ability to activate the political mechanisms that have real 'teeth'.21 
 
For the purpose of this article, I refer to 'social forums' as a large group of 
CB watchers comprising market agents, academic peers, media and 
citizens in general. My main concern is by which legal means this diverse 
group can assess information and motivation of CB monetary actions. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Ruth W Grant and Robert O Keohane, 'Accountability and Abuses of Power in 
World Politics' [2005] 99 APSR 29. 
20 ibid. 
21 See Catalina Smulovitz and Enrique Peruzzotti, 'Societal and Horizontal Controls: 
Two Cases of a Fruitful Relationship' in Scott Mainwaring and Christopher Welna, 
Democratic Accountability in Latin America (OUP 2003). See also Mathew D 
McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, 'Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police 
Patrols versus Fire Alarms' [1984] 28 AJPS 165. 
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IV. ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS FOR CENTRAL BANKS: THE 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE ECB, THE FED AND THE BCB 
 
This section applies the framework set out above, analysing the 
mechanisms for social accountability for the monetary actions of the ECB, 
the Fed and BCB. The key accountability mechanisms identified by this 
research are: (i) the legal basis of central bank mandates, (ii) the monetary 
objectives set for the central banks, and (iii) legal instruments related to 
operational transparency to hold them accountable to different 
stakeholders, at national and international levels. Although the first two 
instruments establish legal parameters to evaluate monetary actions (ex ante 
mechanisms), together all three constitute an accountability process. 
 
1. Legal Basis of Central Bank Mandate 
With respect to political accountability, changes to the legal basis of CBs, 
or merely the threat of such changes may be a sanction for the monetary 
authority. That depends on the legal conditions and political consensus 
required for an amendment to the CBs legal foundation text. Furthermore, 
the legal basis provides parameters for governments and social actors to 
evaluate monetary actions (or inactions). This basis supports the exercise 
of monetary power by CBs and, depending on its degree of 'legalness', can 
strengthen the social perception of monetary authority legitimacy. To 
establish how exactly the legal basis of a CB plays a role as an 
accountability instrument, one must examine its degree of 'legalness'. 
 
Analysis of the institutional basis of CBs reveals three different ways of 
structuring the establishment of a monetary authority by law. The first 
model involves the constitutional recognition of a central bank combined 
with a legislative act structuring its monetary operations. This is the case 
for the BCB. The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 states that monetary 
issues are the exclusive matter of the Federal government and must be 
exercised through a specific institution, namely a 'central bank' (Article 
164, Constitution of 1988). The Brazilian Constitution does not specifically 
invoke the BCB but references a central bank as the institution 
responsible for monetary policy implementation. Therefore, a hypothetical 
annihilation of the BCB would be dependent on a high degree of political 
consensus, since a constitutional amendment would be necessary, requiring 
approval by three fifths of the Congress. Also, the Constitution establishes 
that the financial functions must be defined in a 'complementary act' 
(Article 192, Constitution of 1988) whose approval shall require an absolute 
majority of the Congress (Article 69, Constitution of 1988). 
 
The second model for organizing a monetary authority is illustrated by the 
Fed. The 1787 Constitution of the United States assigns the power to issue 
money to the Congress and does not contain references to a CB. 
References to currency matters in the 1787 Constitution can only be found 
in the description of the power of Congress regarding the regulation of the 
value of currency and the prohibition for individual states to issue paper 
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money (Article 1, Sections 8 and 10, Constitution of 1787). In 1819, the 
Supreme Court of the United States recognized that Congress had the 
constitutional prerogative to make 'necessary' and 'proper' laws in order to 
exercise its powers (Article 1, Section 8, Constitution of 1787) and could 
establish a CB designed specifically for monetary control.22 The Fed is thus 
an agency of the legislative power. 
 
The third model for creating a monetary authority is represented by the 
ECB as a supranational institution. The ECB is not conceived under a legal 
regime created by a single State. It was established by a constitutional 
treaty, born out of an agreement between the Member States of the 
European Union to share their monetary sovereignty. This legislative 
instrument was signed by the executive of Member States and then needed 
to be ratified by their parliaments according to their constitutional 
requirements. The ECB is a European institution under the terms of 
Article 13(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU). The TFEU states that the EU has exclusive competence in 
monetary policy for Member States whose currency is the euro.23  
 
The three models for structuring the monetary authority can be 
summarized as below (table 2). 
 
Table 2 – The legal basis of the ECB, the Fed and the BCB 
 ECB Fed BCB 
Legal basis 
 
 
Supranational 
and 
constitutional 
status, 
monetary 
powers under 
a treaty 
Without 
constitutional 
status, monetary 
powers under a 
Congressional 
act 
 
Constitutional 
status, 
monetary 
powers under 
a 
Congressional 
act 
 
The ECB is the only monetary authority expressly referred to in a 
legislative act that regulates the monetary system. The ECB is also 
recognized as a European institution on par with the entities of the EU 
executive and legislative powers. It has its monetary powers provided by 
the same instrument. In order to change the ECB basis, a (very) high 
political consensus would, therefore, be required.  
 
The European political powers have, thus, lost the most drastic sanction 
for their monetary authority: the ability to change, or even threaten to 
change, its legal basis. The legal structure, which insulates the ECB from 
the threat of legal reform by political actors, may act as a block against the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 McCulloch v Maryland 17 US 316 (1819). 
23 Art 3(1)(c), Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union [2012] OJ C326/01 (TFEU). 
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implementation of any legal sanctions. This design not only ensures a high 
degree of operational autonomy for the ECB, but also means that the 
accountability instruments (especially the political ones) tend to be fewer 
and less effective compared to those available for checking national 
monetary authorities. 
 
There are, however, rules that provide for a simplified revision for the 
ECB and ESCB statutes. In such a process, the Council and the European 
Parliament are the entities involved.24 Nevertheless, the status of 
independence, the monetary objectives and the very existence of the ECB 
cannot be changed by this procedure. This procedure led by the Council 
and Parliament has authority over only very few operational powers. 
Furthermore, the decision-making process provides for the 
recommendation of or consultation with the ECB governing council. This 
demonstrates that the mechanism was not designed specifically as an 
accountability instrument for the EU political powers (as a way to 
eventually 'punish' the CB), but only as a way to make more flexible 
operational and technical changes that are necessary for the ECB itself.25 
 
In times of crisis, the legal basis of the monetary authority is particularly 
important, as witnessed after the 2008 crisis. The time for political 
negotiations and legislative process can cause the success or failure of 
measures to overcome macroeconomic shocks. The design of the 
supranational monetary authority in the euro area tends to multiply veto 
points to such measures. The ECB was pushed to innovate and assumed 
the risk to be challenged by courts.26 However, outside of crisis' events, 
this structure tends to ensure the highest degree of legal predictability. 
 
In a broader perspective, one must recognize that, despite the institutional 
differences between these three monetary authorities, the high degree of 
'legalness' of their institutional basis allows them to operate stably within 
the parameters agreed by political powers by means of a statute or a treaty. 
The social (and political) oversight of their actions (as well as the social 
perception of their responsibilities and powers) tend to be reinforced by 
the fact that their legal structure is subject to negotiations in the political 
arena and is articulated by instruments with a relevant degree of 'legalness'. 
 
2. Monetary Objectives 
Clear and specific monetary objectives to be pursued by the CB are crucial 
parameters for assessing their behaviour. Performance in accordance with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Art 129(4),TFEU.  
25 Carel van der Berg, The Making of Statute of the European System of Central Banks 
(Dutch University Press 2005). 
26 See the CJEU case C-62/14 Peter Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:400. The ECB's outright monetary transactions in secondary 
sovereign bond markets (OMT) was contested by Germany in relation to the 
interpretation of arts 119 TFEU, 123 TFEU and 127 TFEU and of arts 17 to 24 of 
Protocol (No 4) on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the 
European Central Bank. 
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these parameters can be evaluated by both political and social forums. The 
degree of 'legalness' of the act that specifies CB's policy objectives reveals 
the extent to which the monetary target can be used as a predictable and 
stable reference for accountability evaluation. If there are multiple policy 
objectives for the CB, with no hierarchical ordering among them a margin 
of choice is delegated by the political powers to the CB. The monetary 
authority can choose at its discretion to pursue a specific objective over 
another. This ambiguity may make it more difficult for political and social 
forums to monitor and evaluate the CB's behaviour. 
 
Regarding monetary objectives, the CBs of this study can be divided into 
two types. The first type is a CB with priorities designated by political 
powers. The ECB falls into this type. However, the ECB itself 
quantitatively defines its target without the involvement of political 
powers. The second type (containing the BCB and the Fed) comprises 
monetary authorities with multiple objectives. In the BCB's case, the 
inflation targeting system was adopted explicitly by the executive power, 
i.e. this objective was part of the legislative basis of the CB; while in the 
case of the Fed, this system was adopted only by the CB initiative. 
 
The ECB's priorities are explicitly designated by political powers. Article 
282(2) of the TFEU states that price stability is the primary objective of 
the central banks system managed by the ECB. Without prejudice to this 
objective, the ESCB may support other EU economic policies. In 1998, the 
ECB governing council quantified the price stability objective by a collegial 
decision: an average inflation of 2% per year.27 
  
The second type includes both the Fed and the BCB. The Fed aims at full 
employment and price stability objectives, a dual mandate without 
hierarchy,28 alongside a financial stability aim.  Neither the Federal Reserve 
Act, the CB's regulations nor its multiyear strategic plans set priorities or 
quantify objectives. However, it could be argued that the Fed's 
institutional practice since Alan Greenspan's administration was 
consistent with implicit adoption of an inflation targeting system.29 During 
the 2008 crisis, public statements made by former Chairman Ben 
Bernanke referenced an implicit inflation target of 2%. However, it was 
not until January 2012 that the Fed decided to adopt an explicit inflation 
target by a Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)'s decision.30 This 
specific decision, unlike previous public statements, may reveal some 
degree of 'legalness'. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 In 2003, it reformulated the quantitative objective to clarify that its achievement is 
expected in the medium term and in order to avoid deflation risks the target must be 
considered achieved if inflation is below, but close, to 2% (ECB governing council's 
decisions on 13th October, 1998 and 8th May, 2003). 
28 Federal Reserve Act (1913), s 2a. 
29 Goodfriend (n 4); Peter Boffinger, Monetary Policy: Goals, Institutions, Strategies and 
Instruments (OUP 2001). 
30 FOMC decision on 25th January 2012 ('FOMC statement of longer-run goals and 
policy strategy'). 
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Similarly, in the case of the ECB, as in the case of the Fed, I argue that 
their collective deliberation constitutes an act capable of generating legal 
effects. The public statement of their inflation target uses a specific legal 
formula, a particular code. It is possible to identify the will to create a legal 
standard by the issuer of this decision (the ECB governing council and the 
FOMC). The action is intended to create an obligation for the bank itself. 
Furthermore, this decision is directed outside as it can allow social and 
political forums to assess compliance.  
 
From this perspective, the decision of the ECB governing council as well 
as of the FOMC would correspond to a unilateral act of will. For the Fed, 
it took some time to use this code. After 2012, the references to an 
inflation target appear to have the explicit intention of establishing a rule. 
The reference to a 2% target is not vague anymore. It was communicated 
to Congress and is now publicly assumed as a Fed decision.31 However, in 
its statements, the Fed explicitly denied that the consequence of the 
inflation target adoption could be a legal hierarchy or prioritization of its 
monetary objectives. 
 
The BCB must carry out the National Monetary Council (Conselho 
Monetário Nacional – CMN) provisions. The CMN has a political nature 
and it is an institution with multiple functions in accordance with Article 3 
of Law no. 4595 of 1964. Notwithstanding, in 1999, the Brazilian Executive 
– by the adoption of the Decree 3088 – inaugurated an inflation targeting 
system as 'a guideline for the monetary policy regime.' This act introduced 
price stability as a primary objective for the Brazilian monetary system. 
The CMN defines a quantitative inflation target – and a margin of 
tolerance – for each calendar year, which must be achieved by the BCB. 
The Decree is an act that can be changed by the Brazilian President 
without going through a legislative process.32  
 
Amongst the three CBs, the Fed is the only monetary authority that has 
the legal power to choose the policy objective to be prioritized at any 
point. Therefore, it requires close oversight by social and political forums, 
since its multiple goals do not explicitly delineate institutional behaviour. 
This tends to preserve the Fed's political autonomy. However, the Fed is a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 See the 'Semi-annual monetary policy report to Congress before the Committee on 
Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives', Washington D.C., 29th February 
2012. 
32 The adoption of the Decreto 3088 was followed by the abandonment of a fixed 
exchange rate system and was sought to ensure international credibility for Brazilian 
monetary policy. It was originally inspired by the Bank of England's system. See Joel 
Bogdanski, Alexandre Tombini and Sérgio R Werlang, 'Implementing Inflation 
Targeting in Brazil' (2000) BCB Working Paper Series 
 https://www.bcb.gov.br/pec/wps/ingl/wps01.pdf (accessed 5 February 2011). Through 
the Circular 2698 of 1996, the BCB created a special committee serving as the main 
forum for the decision-making process related to monetary policy: the Monetary 
Policy Committee (Comitê de Política Monetária – COPOM) inspired by the FOMC. 
2015]         Social Accountablity of Central Banks      112 
 
	   	  
legislative agency and the US Congress historically intervenes in the 
aftermath of a crisis, creating new mechanisms of surveillance by law. That 
was the case in the 1970s as well as with the 2008 crisis. 
 
The ECB's behaviour can be more easily assessed by social forums. The 
monetary objective established by treaty and the inflation target set by the 
institution are clear and precise. Nevertheless, the act that created a 
quantitative target was issued by the CB itself. As a result, it can be 
changed at any time. Another issue may arise concerning the ECB 
authority to define this rule. Should an EU political body not review this 
type of rule periodically as is the case for the BCB? After all, the 
quantitative inflation target determines the application of a legal standard 
specified by treaty, which was negotiated by political powers. Is the price 
stability defined by the ECB what the EU powers wanted (or want) for the 
eurozone? Would a degree of flexibility be desirable, according to 
European political powers? The Eurozone crisis after 2010 raises this set of 
questions.33 
 
Similarly, the Brazilian monetary regime provides a quantitative criterion 
for evaluation of the BCB's behaviour. However, a ministerial institution, 
the CMN, defines the quantitative target annually: the decision is in the 
hands of a political power. Only the execution is assigned to the BCB. 
Also, the degree of 'legalness' of this act that introduced the inflation 
targeting system raises questions about its stability and predictability. 
After all, it was established by an executive act, so it may be revoked at any 
time without significant institutional constraints. Since 2011, the actual 
institutional practice is to aim at the ceiling of the target range (e.g. to aim 
at inflation of 6,5% when the target is 4,5%, +/- 2%), amplifying the BCB's 
leeway with respect to inflation.34 
 
The following table summarizes the legal instruments for social 
accountability related to the monetary objectives of the BCB, the ECB and 
the Fed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 See Lastra (n 4). 
34 Comitê de Política Monetária (COPOM), 'Ata da 161ª reunião' (31 August 2011) 
https://www.bcb.gov.br/?COPOM161 (accessed 13 June 2015). At that time the BCB 
decided to reduce the basic interest rate (SELIC) even while confirming that the 
accumulated inflation over 2012 was already above the central inflation target of 
4,5%. Note that in the previous month, the expected inflation was the driver reason 
for an increase in the SELIC interest rate. 
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Table 3 – Monetary objectives of the ECB, the Fed and the BCB 
                                    ECB Fed BCB 
Monetary 
Objectives 
 
 
Definition 
of monetary 
objectives 
 
By treaty By statute 
By statute 
and by 
executive 
decree 
Hierarchy of 
monetary 
objectives 
By treaty 
Without 
hierarchy 
(at central 
bank's 
discretion) 
By executive 
decree 
Measuremen
t of 
monetary 
objectives 
Quantitative 
target:  
defined by 
the ECB 
governing 
council 
 
 
Quantitative 
target: 
defined by 
the FOMC  
 
 
Quantitative 
target: 
defined 
periodically 
by a 
ministerial 
institution 
(legal 
structure 
provided by 
an executive 
decree) 
 
3. The Legal Framework for the Relationship Between Central Banks and Social 
Forums  
In this section, the analysis focuses on examining specific social 
accountability mechanisms related to operational transparency. These 
instruments allow for the oversight of monetary policy implemented by 
CBs and are generally directed towards social and market forums – but 
they can also be used by political powers. Specifically, they are related to 
the legal obligation of disclosing the economic rationale of monetary 
actions. 
 
The three CBs analysed in this study have legal mechanisms for social 
accountability. Interestingly, some mechanisms were established by a 
regulation created by the CB itself or were extended at the initiative of the 
monetary authority from stipulations issued by political powers. That is to 
say, in some cases the monetary authorities themselves introduced 
measures that made them more accountable.   
 
The BCB, through the issuance of a Circular (regulatory decision),35 created 
new legal mechanisms for social accountability in 2005, since it requires 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Circular 3297 2005 (BR). 
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the agency to disclose its decisions and motivations for policies. According 
to Article 5 of this Circular, the decision on interest rate policy taken by 
the BCB's monetary policy committee shall be publicly released.36 These 
minutes provide the committee reasoning, the relevant data on which the 
deliberation was based, as well as the final decision, indicating the number 
of votes and, since May 2012,37 revealing the identity of dissenting 
members. The Brazilian Executive has also created a mechanism for social 
accountability. The BCB is required to release reports containing an 
analysis of the inflation targeting performance, the impact of past 
monetary decisions and a prospective inflation evaluation.38 
 
The acts of the Brazilian executive power and its CB suggest a change in 
their institutional behaviour. Created in 1964, the administration inherited 
from the authoritarian regime conceived legal obligations for social 
accountability by its own initiative and by the executive power, to which it 
is explicitly linked. The inertia of the legislature in creating legal 
instruments for social accountability was overcome by the monetary 
authority itself in the last decade. Even if, at first, the institutional 
innovation of the CB aimed to achieve efficiency in monetary policy 
implementation, it ultimately created – especially, after the adoption of 
inflation targeting system in 1999 – a form of social accountability, not 
only by its institutional behaviour, but also by issuing acts having a certain 
degree of 'legalness' (Circulares). These acts have not only created an 
obligation for the BCB, but also assigned an authority to social forums 
assessing its compliance. 
 
The ECB has a particular structure. In Europe, the general rule is that 'any 
citizen of the Union […], shall have a right of access to documents of the 
Union's institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, whatever their medium' 
and 'each institution, body, office or agency shall ensure that its 
proceedings are transparent.'39 However, the same article withdraws the 
ECB from this general principle as regards its monetary decisions. 
 
The confidentiality of the ECB deliberations is guaranteed by the treaty 
and regulated by the CB, which specifies a period of thirty years for their 
disclosure.40 Article 132(2) of the TFEU delegates the disclosure of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Art 4, § 4 states that the minutes of its meetings must be disclosed within six days 
after their conclusion. The calendar of meetings should be made public in October 
each year. See Circular 3297 2005 (BR), art 6. 
37 BCB executive board's vote no. 97 on 16th May 2012 in accordance with Lei de Acesso 
à Informação 2011(BR). 
38 See Decree 3088 of 1999 (BR). The BCB is also obliged to publish an analysis of its 
past actions and the Brazilian inflation targeting system development (reports on 
inflation – 'relatórios de inflação'). 
39 Art 15(3),TFEU.  
40 Public access to ECB documents is governed by its decision on 4th March 2004 
(ECB/2004/3; 2004/258/C), pursuant to art 10(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the 
ECB Governing Council and art 23(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the ECB. This 
decision governs the ad hoc procedure to access ECB documents. Free access is 
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decisions to the ECB's discretion. Protocol 4 states that the governing 
council meetings are confidential and that it is up to the ECB to announce 
them.41  
 
The ECB institutional practice has been to release its decision in a public 
statement after its main monetary policy meeting. Then, the institution 
organizes a press conference (with its president and vice-president) and a 
press conference open to journalists' questions, in which the motivations 
for its decision are revealed. In February 2015, the ECB decided to publish 
its minutes. The Financial Times attributed this decision to the 'public 
pressure for more accountability after the global financial crisis [that] has 
forced traditionally secretive rate setters to open up.'42 Politically, 
however, the power to decide the degree of transparency and the level of 
social accountability concerning monetary decisions is granted to the ECB. 
 
Yet the ECB does not disclose whether there were any dissenting votes in 
the final decision. The institution presents its deliberation as the result of 
a 'consensus'. This position is justified by the bank's desire to preserve its 
operational independence, avoiding political pressure on central bankers 
who form its council.43 This allows members of the national CBs to act in a 
European perspective 'decoupled' from their national positions. 
 
Regarding disclosure of monetary information, the main difference 
between the ECB and the BCB is that the latter decided to issue acts in 
order to create obligations related to social accountability. Although the 
ECB has behaved in this way since its creation, releasing pertinent 
monetary information, there were no obligations explicitly stated in legal 
acts issued by the institution prior to 2015. For the BCB, it is clear that 
there is a formal requirement regarding the disclosure of information, even 
if its degree of 'legalness' is low: it is a mere regulation (Circular). For the 
ECB, the disclosure of decisions and their motivation through press 
releases and conferences have been a practice since June 1998. Sessions 
opened to journalists' questions began in October 1998. This practice was 
conducted by all presidents that the institution has had. There seems to be 
a political intention to continue this behaviour. In this sense, I also argue 
that there is a degree of 'legalness' in this ECB act. 
 
When it comes to analysing the case of the Fed, there is a wide range of 
legislative provisions concerning accountability, also expanded or specified 
in the Fed's regulations. Regarding the application of the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA), the Board of Directors issued the Regulations 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
possible only thirty years after the monetary decision, unless otherwise determined by 
the body responsible for issuing it (pursuant to art 10(3), Rules of Procedure of the 
ECB governing council and art 23(3), Rules of Procedure of the ECB). 
41 Art 10(4), Protocol No 4.  
42 See 'European Central Bank opens up with release of minutes' (19 February 2015) 
Financial Times. 
43 See the ECB Monthly Bulletin, November 2002. 
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Regarding Availability of Information.44 Section 261.10 of this instrument 
provides that the board of directors must publish various reports on Fed's 
actions. 
 
The Government in the Sunshine Act of 1976 states (with certain 
exceptions) that 'every portion of every meeting of agency shall be open to 
public observation.'45 Notwithstanding, the statute provides exceptions for 
meetings that can lead to 'financial speculation' or put a financial 
institution at risk. The Rules Regarding Public Observation of Meetings, 
issued by the board of directors, states that the meetings related to 
'monetary policy matters' (section 261b.7, a) should be conducted without 
public observation because they could cause 'financial speculation'. In the 
Statements of Policy (12 CFR 281) issued by the FOMC, the Fed argued 
that the FOMC does not correspond to the definition of federal 'agency' 
contained in the Government in the Sunshine Act of 1976. The FOMC is a 
committee, unlike the Fed's Board of Directors. Thus, the FOMC would 
not need to immediately disclose transcripts of the meetings that are not 
available. However, the committee, 'recognizing the purpose of the 
legislative power' in enacting this statute, decided to publicize a 'record of 
policy actions' one month after its meetings. According to the Fed, this 
complies with the legal requirements. 
 
Since 1994, the FOMC releases files with a record of its actions and 
detailed transcripts of its meetings five years after they occurred. 
Moreover, in the same year, it became an institutional practice to 
announce changes in interest rate policy immediately after the meetings. 
According to Alan Greenspan, at that time there was a strong legislative 
pressure for the adoption of this practice.46 Since 1999, the committee has 
announced its policy decision even if there has been no change. Since 
2004, the minutes of meetings are available three weeks after the 
respective meeting, however transcripts continue to only be disclosed five 
years later. The interest rate decision is notified immediately by a press 
release. There are also press conferences conducted by the chairman. 
Unlike the ECB, the Fed reveals the positions and names of committee 
members who dissented from the final decision. 
 
In 2010, in the aftermath of the economic crisis and given the increased 
powers acquired by the Fed to intervene in financial markets, the US 
Congress decided to amend the Federal Reserve Act to include new 
mechanisms for its social accountability. The two main mechanisms are: (i) 
the creation of a page on the Fed's website entitled 'Audit', which became 
a repository of information on the Fed's performance and provides all 
reports to the Congress and those prepared by independent auditors and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 The Rules Regarding Public Observation of Meetings (12 CFR), s 261b. 
45 Sunshine Act (1976), s 552b. 
46 John T Wooley, 'The US Federal Reserve and the Politics of Monetary and 
Financial Regulatory Policies' in Kenneth Dyson and Martin Marcussen, Central 
Banks in the Age of the Euro: Europeanization, Convergence and Power (OUP 2009). 
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by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) and other relevant information 
that the board of directors 'reasonably believes is necessary or helpful to 
the public in understanding the accounting, financial reporting, and 
internal controls of the Board and the Federal reserve Banks' (my 
emphasis)47 as well as (ii) the disclosure of information on emergency loans 
granted and on the open market operations conducted by the Fed during 
the crisis management.48 
 
The Fed, compared to the BCB and the ECB, is the monetary authority 
most subject to rules of a legislative nature for social accountability. Also, 
the Fed wanted more than just a political and sporadic decision to disclose 
information: it designed special measures in order to create a legal obligation 
to release such information. 
 
As the Fed has been closely monitored by the US Congress in post-crisis 
periods, during the 1970s and post-2008,49 the Fed's own initiatives to 
publish regular data and regulate its disclosure tend to potentially avoid 
confrontations with the legislative power. The Fed has taken steps to 
determine the format, frequency and quantity of data to be disclosed that 
could prevent future unilateral decisions taken by the Congress. In 
particular, this seems to be the case for rules relating to the application of 
the Government in the Sunshine Act. 
 
Legal instruments for monetary policy accountability related to social 
forums can be summarized as follows in Table 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Federal Reserve Act (1913), s 2b. 
48 Federal Reserve Act (1913), s 11s. 
49 The Federal Reserve Reform Act of 1977 and the Dodd-Frank Act are the main 
legislative initiates that changed the accountability of the Fed. 
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Table 4 – The legal framework for the relationship between 
central banks and social forums 
 
                                ECB Fed BCB 
The legal 
framework 
for the 
relationship 
between 
central 
banks and 
social 
forums  
 
Rules 
related to 
disclosure 
of decisions 
(interest 
rate policy) 
 
Institutional 
behavior 
 
via press release 
 
 
 
Statute 
and 
regulations 
via press 
release 
 
Regulations 
(Circulares) 
via press 
release 
 
Rules 
related to 
disclosure 
of 
motivation 
(interest 
rate policy) 
 
 
Institutional 
behavior and, 
after 2015, 
ECB decision 
via press 
conference and 
minutes 
 
 
Statute 
and 
regulations 
 
via minutes 
and others 
means 
 
Regulations 
(Circulares) 
 
 
via minutes 
 
 
Rules 
related to 
disclosure 
of data 
(decision 
basis) and 
motivation 
 
 
Institutional 
behavior and 
treaty 
 
press 
conferences, 
monthly 
bulletins and 
minutes 
 
 
Statutes 
and 
regulations 
 
several 
methods of 
publication 
(reports, 
bulletins, 
minutes, 
etc.) 
 
Executive 
decree 
 
 
reports on 
inflation 
 
Rules 
related to 
disclosure 
of financial 
information 
 
 
Treaty 
(frequency 
extended by 
institutional 
behavior) 
 
 
Statute 
and 
regulations 
 
 
Statute 
 
V. WHAT DO THESE INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES REVEAL?  
 
Given the growing complexity of monetary issues, it seems that the role of 
law (as a system for structuring the exercise of power by CBs) has changed. 
This transformation comes from the change of paradigm concerning CB 
interventions in currency management: from an action manipulated and ex 
ante controllable by administrative rules (rule-based instruments) to an 
action in which these institutions operate primarily as agents in open 
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market operations (market-based instruments).50 Actually, CBs no longer 
manage currency by preponderantly issuing binding norms, as was usual in 
the 1960-70s, especially with respect to reserve requirements.51 Instead, as 
a main model of policy implementation, CBs act as market agents, 
formalizing repurchase agreements (open market operations) and swap 
contracts. Moreover, they intervene in financial markets by shaping 
incentives, i.e. by setting short-term interest rates and inflation targets.52 
 
As a result, the role of public law in creating a framework for monetary 
policy implementation has moved: (i) from outlining instrumental rules for 
policy actions (ex ante regulation, e.g. the legal limits on reserve 
requirements or the gold standard as political control of paper money's 
expansion) (ii) to establishing legal mechanisms to render discretionary 
actions accountable (a model of ex post regulation, e.g. the duty to report 
monetary actions to the Congress or the disclosure of their motivation to a 
wider audience). The historical pendulum movement between 'rules' and 
'discretion' in monetary policy seems to point to more 'discretion' for 
contemporary central banking.53 However, the presence of accountability 
mechanisms in central bank framework means presence of rules, regardless 
their degree of 'legalness'. 
 
The legal design of an accountability mechanism consists in an ex post 
structure, since the institutional process presupposes the assessment of an 
act (or of an omission) that has already been implemented by a CB (e.g., a 
short-term interest rate). Even if it takes prior legal parameters for 
behaviour, such as monetary goals or inflation targets, into account, the ex 
ante element has a 'cognitive' nature, i.e. the anticipation of a future 
assessment.54 Given this shifting pattern of monetary policy, the 
accountability relationship implies scrutiny of CBs' discretionary actions 
that were taken based on parameters previously set out by a legal standard. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Bernard J Laurens, Monetary Policy Implementation at Different Stages in Market 
Development (IMF Occasional Paper 2005). 
51 Reserve requirements are the amount of funds that a depository institution must 
hold in reserve against deposit liabilities. 
52 Iain Begg, 'Monetary Policy Strategies' in Marcussen Dyson, Central Banks in the Age 
of the Euro: Europeanization, Convergence and Power (OUP 2009); Ben S Bernanke; 
Thomas Laubach; Frederic S Mishinki and Adam S Posen, Inflation Targeting: Lessons 
from International Experience (PUP 1999); Ulrich Bindseil, Monetary Policy 
Implementation: Theory, Past, Present (OUP 2004); Boffinger (n 29); Goodfriend (n 4). 
53 For an important analysis on this subject, see Stanley Fischer, 'Rules versus 
discretion in monetary policy' in B M Friedman and F H Han, Handbook of Monetary 
Economics, vol II (Elsevier 1990). For an interesting historical account involving 
Benjamin Strong of the New York Federal Reserve, see Robert L Hetzel, 'The rule 
versus discretion debate over monetary policy in the 1920s', (1985) Federal Reserve 
Bank of Richmond Economic Review 71. 
54 Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, 'Le Couple ex ante-ex post, Justification d'un Droit 
Propre et Spécifique de la Régulation' in Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, Les Engagements 
dans les Systémes de Régulation  (Dalloz 2006). 
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The operational transparency envisaged by CBs was initially aimed at 
monetary policy efficiency, an economic goal. It was the product of a 
change of economic consensus on monetary policy.55 Nevertheless, the 
creation of these mechanisms had a secondary and relevant (legal) effect: 
institutionalizing structures allowing for social accountability. These same 
instruments are also available for political powers' scrutiny of monetary 
authorities. 
 
I believe that, instead of CBs resorting to a battle in the political arena – 
to include accountability mechanisms in statutes or treaties through 
political negotiations – they may have found a faster, though no less 
effective, means of institutional innovation and experimentation. In other 
words, CBs have improved their legal framework for accountability 
through soft law instruments – i.e. the enactment of regulations and 
unilateral acts that can generate legal effects. I argue that these 
mechanisms of operational transparency (e.g. regulations and unilateral 
acts that create obligations in communicating monetary decisions) can 
indeed serve as legal instruments for social accountability. Actually, they 
consist of rules that create legal parameters for scrutinizing and checking 
CB actions through soft legal instruments. In this sense, the mechanisms 
referred to by economists as 'de facto accountability' and 'operational 
transparency'56 in fact consist of legal instruments for social accountability. 
These instruments frame a specific relationship between central banks and 
social forums, and they can have different degrees of 'legalness'. 
 
Therefore, there is an emergence of a new legal approach:57 (i) from a 
traditional 'exogenous' normativity approach imposed by the State (ii) to 
an 'endogenous' normativity approach that is non-hierarchical, created by 
economic agents themselves, including by regulatory authorities that act as 
a market agent in order to develop their functions. This model reveals a 
polycentric and decentralized regulatory regime, which is characterized by 
its fragmentation and complexity as well as interdependence between 
different social actors where the State bureaucracy is no longer the sole 
locus of authority. 
 
This administrative trend changed the structure and role of the State in 
the monetary policy. Moreover, it is possible to argue that it had an impact 
on the accountability design of public structures. Especially for CBs, as 
shown in the prvious section, I believe that a trend can be identified: (i) 
from rules of accountability designed by constitutions, statutes and treaties 
(rules created by States) and aimed primarily at accountability to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 See n 4. 
56 See, for instance, Laurens et al. (n 5) and Bank for International Settlements (BIS), 
Issues in the Governance of Central Banks: a Report from the Central Bank Governance Group 
(BIS 2009). 
57 Julia Black, 'Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in a 
Polycentric Regulatory Regimes' (2008) LSE 
 http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS2008-02_Black.pdf (accessed 14 June 
2013); Jacques Chevallier, L'État post-modern (LGDJ 2004); Timsit (n 15). 
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political authorities (ii) to rules produced by the CBs themselves self-
regulating their actions and aimed at legitimising their decisions, mainly 
geared towards social forums. 
 
In the economic debate, this movement towards more transparency and 
open communication by CBs is aimed at ensuring monetary policy 
implementation. The mystery of the bureaucratic performance has been 
replaced by transparency of methods and goals. Moreover, in addition to 
the efficiency gains of transparency, it is possible that these bureaucracies 
hope that more communication to the public in general can eventually 
ensure greater legitimacy for CB's actions. In other words, transparency 
can help to assure, together with other institutional mechanisms, the social 
acceptance of the CB's mandate.  
 
Given an economic approach, transparency and predictability are 
prerequisites for monetary policy effectiveness in globalized and complex 
financial markets. From the point of a political and legal view, 
transparency is a precondition (i) to legitimate monetary policy 
implemented by de facto or de jure independent CBs and (ii) for the 
accountability of these institutions – it enables social forums and political 
institutions to monitor and evaluate their operation.58 In the 2008 
aftermath, these instruments proved to be valuable to politicians, 
academics and the media. The monetary actions of the most important 
CBs were widely divulgated. For instance, the Group of 30 (G30), an 
intellectual community in central banking, published a detailed report on 
CB responses to crisis.59 All these materials were made available by the 
CBs. 
 
The 'unelected bodies' or 'non-majoritarian institutions,60 e.g. independent 
CBs and regulatory agencies, have a direct source of legitimacy, and not 
only the legitimacy derived from their establishment by political powers. 
Their legitimacy can be compared to the legitimacy of the judiciary. They 
are responsible for the empirical component of public policies and for the 
professional judgments on a deeply technical subject, developing analysis 
of evidence and data. They are public structures responsible for problem 
solving, in contrast to political powers responsible for value judgments.61 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Pedro Schwartz and Juan Castañeda, 'Central Banks: from Politically Independent 
to Market-Dependent Institutions' (2009) 3(29) EA 
 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1484145 (accessed 27 July 2010). 
59 The Group of 30, 'The Fundamentals of central banking : lessons from the crisis' 
Washington DC (2015) http://group30.org/images/PDF/CentralBanking.pdf (accessed 
16 October 2015).  
60 Frank Vibert, The Rise of the Unelected: Democracy and the New Separation of Powers 
(CUP 2007); Mark Thatcher and Alec Stone Sweet, 'Theory and Practice of 
Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions' (2002) WEP 25(1) 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1073&context=fss_pap
ers (accessed 7 June 2013). 
61 Vibert, (n 60); Pierre Rosanvallon, La Contre Démocratie: la Politique à L'âge de la 
Défiance  (Éditions du Seuil 2006). 
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CBs have a specific knowledge related to the currency management on 
which they base their technical authority. They are what Robert Castel62 
defines as the 'expert instituant', i.e. authorities that not only assess a given 
situation from their technical point of view, but also recreate the empirical 
conditions with their own knowledge. In other words, monetary 
authorities are functional experts who deal with data and shape evidence at 
the same time. The function of a CB goes beyond the expression of an 
opinion, a compilation of information or the design of a mere report to 
resolve a conflict or clarify a political choice. CBs define their own 
technical criteria and the actual circumstances to which they devote 
themselves. As a result, this institutional structure is more complex than a 
body merely designed to analyse empirical evidence and data.  
 
Furthermore, these agencies are embedded in epistemic communities both 
at the domestic and international level. Epistemic communities are 
networks of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a 
particular area.63 They claim authority over a relevant field of knowledge. 
They also share a specific set of values, norms and beliefs, which is derived 
from their analysis of practical problems in an expertise domain. Epistemic 
communities also share notions of validity while defining the criteria for 
selection of problems and their solutions.64 For CBs, the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) has institutionalized international 
cooperation among monetary authorities. In such arrangements, CBs are 
national representatives, imbued with the powers to decide standards or 
policies at the international level that will be implemented within their 
territories. The Basel Accords on financial market regulation is just one 
example. 
 
As a matter of fact, monetary authorities have heavily invested in their 
research departments to establish and build the bases for their decisions 
and economic evaluations. The symbolic effect is an ideological consensus 
in relation to the technical knowledge of monetary policy. For example, in 
December 2002, 74% of the publications on monetary policy, in edited 
journals in the United States and published by US economists, came from 
the Fed-published journals or were co-authored by a Fed staff economist.65 
The fifty largest PhD-granting economic institutions in the US employ 
around 390 economists in macroeconomics, monetary policy and banking. 
The US Fed system alone used to have 27% more.66 In terms of full-time 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Robert Castel, Figures Professionnelles: Dispositions Règlementaires et Genèse de 
l'Expertise - l'Expert Mandaté et l'Extpert Instituant. Situation d'Expertise et Socialisation des 
Savoirs (CRESAL 1985). 
63 Peter M Haas, 'Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy 
Coordination' [1992] 46 IO 1. 
64 ibid; Sheila Jasanoff, 'Peer Review in the Regulatory Process' (1985) 1(5) STHV 
http://sth.sagepub.com/content/10/3/20.full.pdf (accessed 23 August 2012). 
65 Lawrence White, 'The Federal Reserve System's Influence on Research in 
Monetary Economics' (2005) 2(2) EJW http://econjwatch.org/file_download/90/2005-
08-white-invest_apparatus.pdf (accessed 15 March 2015). 
66 ibid.  
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researchers, the ECB has more PhDs in economics than the London 
School of Economics and Political Science – LSE.67 In 1999, the BCB 
created its Department of Research and Economics Studies ('Depep') with 
offices in three major cities (Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo). The 
person responsible for the creation of the Depep, Alexandre Tombini, is 
currently the BCB governor. 
 
Marcussen68 identifies a further step in the development of CBs in the 
2000s. He points out that there is an important feature in the current 
situation that makes it more difficult to assess CBs' performance: the rise 
of a scientific discourse in monetary decisions. The movement of 
'scientization' in central banking poses new challenges for accountability 
and the relationship between social forums and technocrats. The main 
concern is how social forums can engage with a high-specialized 
institution, as well as how to exercise controls on its power (which seems 
to be based on knowledge and 'science'). While the 1990s were 
characterized by the discourse of political autonomy for CBs, the 2000s 
seems to be characterized by the ideological process of 'scientization' in 
currency management, reinforced by the growing reliance on research 
departments.69 
 
Nowadays, CBs tend to ensure their legitimacy and their authority in 
currency management using ideas of the scientific domain, mainly from 
economics. Science has becomes the source of their cognitive authority. 
For instance, the 'Taylor rule', created by the Stanford economist John B 
Taylor to describe (and then to prescribe) the Fed's policy,70 became a 
recipe for central bank practice. This policy 'rule' was incorporated in the 
political economic analysis or the decision-making process of CBs in 
advanced and emerging economies.71 
 
With the 2008 crisis, these technocrats gained more power and technical 
credibility in order to intervene in markets. Their scientific discourse 
seems to be valued again and it was extended to the political domain. For 
instance, in Europe, as an immediate response to crisis, a former central 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Martin Marcussen, 'Scientization of Central Banking: the Politics of A-
politicization' in Dyson Marcussen, Central Banks in the Age of the Euro: 
Europeanization, Convergence and Power (OUP 2009). 
68 ibid. 
69 ibid. 
70 John B Taylor, 'Discretion versus policy rules in practice' (1993) Carnegie-
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 39; 195–214, 202. 
71 See the empirical analysis of Pier F Asso, George A Kahn and Robert Leeson, 'The 
Taylor rule and the practice of central baning' (2010) The Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City RWP 10-05 
https://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/reswkpap/pdf/rwp10-05.pdf (accessed 10 
January 2015). 
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banker, Lucas Papademos, and a former European bureaucrat, Mario 
Monti, were appointed as prime ministers of their home countries.72 
 
Accountability mechanisms as a model of ex post regulation tend to gain 
more significance with the growing discretionary powers of CBs. However, 
can these mechanisms actually be effective? Who can understand the 
minutes of the CB's meetings? How to assess the political options available 
and the trade-offs underlying them? Monetary decisions have 
distributional effects, but economic language tends to create difficulties in 
understanding them at their core. Therefore, two crucial questions remain: 
is the contemporary movement towards CB transparency, in fact, more of 
secrecy? If positive, how could accountability mechanisms created by soft 
law overturn this tendency? The legal structure for monetary 
accountability is an institutional reality, regardless its degree of 'legalness'. 
It has the potential to allow social actors to contest the political choices of 
CBs. To overcome the complexity of these economic decisions, the social 
forums that are capable to scrutinize them are mainly academia and 
specialized media. Nevertheless, in different degrees, sanctions with 'teeth' 
are only at the disposal of political powers. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
In the CBs studied, there were standards and procedures developed by law 
that provided them with mandates and objectives. The sources of law that 
lay out the CBs' mandates and also prescribe procedures and standards for 
their actions, are quite different from each other. Nevertheless, it is 
possible to identify two types of legal mechanisms specifically for their 
accountability: (i) 'hard' rules of accountability designed by constitutions, 
statutes and treaties and aimed mainly at accountability to political agents, 
and (ii) more recent 'soft' rules created by the CBs themselves and geared 
towards social accountability. The analysis of the legal structure of these 
instruments revealed that most institutional changes in monetary policy 
accountability in recent decades took place through mechanisms with a 
low degree of 'legalness' (more of soft law). This trend is common to the 
three CBs studied. 
 
In the case of the ECB, the absence of hard mechanisms of social 
accountability pushed the bank to create its own rules on an inflation 
target and mechanisms to publish its own decisions, even though the 
European treaty gave the opportunity to the ECB operating without such 
disclosure. Did the ECB create these 'soft' rules just as a concern about 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 However, as pointed by Borio, after the 2008 economic crisis CBs have been facing 
three major challenges: economic, intellectual and institutional. See Claudio Borio, 
'Central Banking Post-Crisis' (2011) BIS Working Paper 353 1/2011 
http://www.bis.org/publ/work353.pdf (accessed 10 March 2013). See also Michael 
Aglietta, 'Complément A: La Rénovation des Politiques Monétaires' (2011) Rapport 
CAE 1/2011, 195 http://www.cae-eco.fr/Rapport-Banques-centrales-et-stabilite-
financiere.html (accessed 8 September 2012); Goodhart (n 4). 
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monetary policy efficiency? I believe that this decision was also taken to 
legitimize its actions in a complex political environment. 
 
In the case of the BCB, formal mechanisms of social accountability were 
established by the executive power and through regulations. These rules, 
created in the late 1990s, were aimed at monetary policy efficiency and to 
raise international market confidence. However, I believe that these 
mechanisms have also proved themselves useful for (i) the legitimacy of the 
Brazilian central bank decision-making process during 2000s, as well as (ii) 
safeguarding its de facto independence from political powers. 
 
In the case of the Fed, the creation of an inflation target after the 2008 
crisis was an unexpected political event, since the institution has been 
avoiding the definition of a quantitative criterion since the 1990s. 
However, the Fed has a traditional practice of creating accountability 
mechanisms related to operational transparency since the administration 
of Governor Alan Greenspan. 
 
The exact mechanisms for social accountability, and the process of their 
creation, appear to be shaped by shared economic beliefs. The historical 
and institutional framework (in which monetary authorities operate) tends 
to be relevant to the design of their relationship with political powers and 
social forums. However, global theoretical-economic convergence in 
monetary policy, i.e. operational transparency for the interest rate policy, 
may be the most important driver of the common trend among these three 
CBs: the creation of social accountability mechanisms often led by the 
monetary authority itself. 
 
These 'transparency' mechanisms were originally intended as a means to 
achieve efficiency in currency management. However, the instruments of 
monetary transparency have established a legal structure for social 
accountability. Their creation has led to the introduction of instruments 
not only of technical and political nature, but also of a legal nature 
destined to social accountability.  
 
Actually, it is difficult to come back and change this structure by the CBs 
themselves. Once this legal set-up becomes an institutional reality, even if 
a 'soft'one, it creates a legal expectation, potentially allowing social actors 
to contest the political choices underlying policy decisions. This structure 
tends to be relevant especially in the post-crisis context. 
